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THE 2014 SMU CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COLLOQUIUM: AN INTRODUCTION
Meghan J. Ryan*
Jenia lontcheva Turner**THE 2014 SMU Criminal Justice Colloquium brought together
scholars from across the country to discuss cutting-edge issues in
criminal law and procedure. Headlined scholars Stephen Garvey,
Albert Alschuler, Darryl Brown, Nancy King, Nancy Marder, and Ronald
Wright have graciously contributed their articles to this Colloquium Is-
sue. Their pieces explore the state's authority to criminalize and punish,
and how safeguards are necessary to ensure that actors within the crimi-
nal justice system are using their delegated powers responsibly.
A state's authority to criminalize and punish has limits. One possible
limit is that only those possessing a guilty mind should be subject to the
criminal law-a notion challenged by the creation of strict liability crimes
and by the punishment of those ignorant of the law. Another possible
limit is that criminal statutes must be clear and unambiguous. Lawmakers
should draft statutes carefully to ensure that they clearly define criminal
conduct and reach only those who are truly culpable. Prosecutors, too,
must use their powers responsibly, charging suspects and negotiating
pleas with offenders in a manner consistent with truth and fairness. Juries
might be able to provide a check on the state's powers to prosecute, con-
vict, and punish, but there are limits to juries' effectiveness in this regard.
Juries may give too much or too little weight to particular evidence, or
they may be distracted by unreliable evidence. As citizens, lawmakers,
attorneys, and scholars work to improve the American criminal justice
system, it is important to keep in mind the unique roles that each of these
actors play. Neither prosecutors nor juries are infallible, and it is impor-
tant to incorporate safeguards into the system to ensure that their actions
advance our objectives of fairness, truth, and justice.
In Authority, Ignorance, and the Guilty Mind, Stephen Garvey takes
the reader through a nuanced discussion of mens rea and the maxim that
ignorance of the law is no excuse to criminal liability. He begins by
describing mens rea as a limitation on the state's authority to censure and
punish. This mens rea consists of both an actor's ability to freely choose
to engage in an activity contrary to the criminal law and the actor's choice
"manifest[ing] a quality of will inconsistent with that of a law-abiding
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citizen."'
Garvey argues that knowledge of, or at least regard for, the criminality
of one's actions is essential to mens rea-that a state lacks the authority
to censure or punish an individual who has no knowledge that the con-
duct in which he engaged was criminal. 2 Garvey stakes out a minority
view in this regard, although he continues to pare away at this position as
he fleshes out the boundaries of his claim.
Central to Garvey's view are the limits of the state's authority and the
ambit of mens rea. He explains that the state possesses the authority to
require its citizens to obey certain moral obligations, but that the state is
bound by the requirement that actors must possess sufficient mens rea
before being held criminally liable. Cognitive attitudes lie along at least
two different axes-the first being the actor's "confidence in the truth" of
his determination about the criminality of his actions, and the second be-
ing the extent of the actor's awareness of his knowledge of criminality at
the time of his actions.3 Garvey suggests that the mens rea threshold is
met when the actor at least suspects the criminality of his actions and this
suspicion "could be summoned to mind with little or no effort."4
Garvey's understanding of mens rea is in tension, though, with the
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. He explains that an actor
may sometimes be found criminally liable despite this ignorance, such as
when the actor, prior to acting, failed on his obligation to gather relevant
evidence regarding the criminality of his later action and discern its crimi-
nal nature. This, Garvey explains, preserves the notion that "[a]n actor
cannot legitimately be subject to criminal liability unless at some point in
the story he has made a choice realizing that in so choosing he has done
something that can render him vulnerable to criminal liability."5 This
seems to be akin to the felony murder doctrine and in some respect nar-
rows Garvey's position that ignorance of the law does indeed excuse.
Garvey explains, though, that an actor may escape liability if his igno-
rance results from one facet of his mind distracting or overwhelming his
entire will.6 Garvey compares this to a rogue actor on the stage hijacking
the scene from the rest of the cast and distracting the audience in doing
so; it is the rogue actor, not the rest of the cast, which is responsible for
this diversion.7 In the same way, one rogue desire may distract a would-
be offender from his entire will, and we cannot hold the entire will re-
1. Stephen P. Garvey, Authority, Ignorance, and the Guilty Mind, 67 SMU L. REV.
545, 547 (2014).
2. Id. at 547-48 (noting that a person acts with a guilty mind when he engages in
criminal activity knowing that it was criminal, or at least acting with "insufficient concern
or regard for" that fact).
3. Id. at 557-58.
4. Garvey refers to this two-part cognitive attitude as "dispositional suspicion." Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 569-70. According to Garvey, "The culprit in such cases is not the actor's
will. The culprit is a part of his will, and a part is not a fair reflection of the whole." Id. at
570.
7. See id. at 570-71.
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sponsible for this.8 As Garvey recognizes, analyses such as this require
drawing "metaphysical boundaries" 9-a task that has become more diffi-
cult as scientific knowledge begins to invade the realm of moral philoso-
phy, and a task that also becomes difficult when trying to put theory into
practice.
Finally, Garvey narrows his position on ignorance as an excuse by sug-
gesting that, while these individuals may be found criminally liable, they
ought not be punished if their acts were committed with ignorance of the
law. As Garvey acknowledges, this position deserves greater explana-
tion:10 Why might censure be deserved in this circumstance but not pun-
ishment? And what is the value of censure without punishment?
Moreover, Garvey's view of punishment seems to be rooted in retributiv-
ism." But are other theories of punishment relevant here, and if so, do
they support this position that censure, but not punishment, is appropri-
ate when an individual commits a crime ignorant of the criminality of his
conduct? And how does this approach to censure and punishment dove-
tail with states' uses of strict liability crimes? These are just some of the
questions that Garvey's unique understandings of mens rea, ignorance,
and punishment raise, and Garvey's article provides helpful fodder for
continuing the discussion and addressing important limitations on state
authority.
In addition to observing limits on the state's authority to punish, it is
important to recognize that there are limitations on how effectively and
intelligently lawmakers summon their powers to criminalize and punish.
In Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy's Proposal to
"Fix" Skilling v. United States, Albert Alschuler highlights the problems
created in the criminal justice system when lawmakers concentrate more
on getting reelected than on creating sound criminal statutes. 12 Illustrat-
ing these difficulties, Alschuler examines Senator Leahy's proposal to
8. See id.
9. Id. at 568. In discussing the related issue of whether we should hold liable an actor
who was ignorant that his act constituted a crime but simply "didn't give a damn," Garvey
muses:
We shouldn't expect to reach consensus. The answer after all involves draw-
ing the metaphysical boundaries of the responsible self. Can we bear respon-
sibility for the wrongs we choose to do only if we realize we are choosing to
do wrong? Is the responsible self-confined to the will qua executive capacity?
Or can we also bear responsibility for the quality of our will, at least when
the quality of our will is ill and blinds us to the wrong we do? Does the
responsible self also include the will qua conative capacity?
Id. at 568-69.
10. See id. at 573 n.70 ("More needs to be said here about why the state's response to
the defiant can involve punishment, while its response to the non-defiant must be limited
to censure. My sense is that imposing the hardship or burden or whatnot associated with
punishment is simply unfair . . . .").
11. See id. ("Punishment is conventionally, if not uncontroversially, understood as the
intentional infliction of some hardship, burden, suffering and so forth on a culpable wrong-
doer for the wrong he culpably committed with the intent thereby to censure or condemn
him for that culpably-committed wrong.").
12. Albert W. Alschuler, Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy's
Proposal to "Fix" Skilling v. United States, 67 SMU L. REv. 501 (2014).
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shore up the honest-services section1 3 of the federal mail fraud statute1 4
to save it from being unconstitutionally vague as the Supreme Court sug-
gested in Skilling v. United States.15 The Skilling Court stated that, "In
proscribing fraudulent deprivations of 'the intangible right of honest ser-
vices,' . . . Congress intended at least to reach schemes to defraud involv-
ing bribes and kickbacks. [But] [c]onstruing the honest-services statute to
extend beyond that core meaning . . . would encounter a vagueness
shoal."16 Senator Leahy's proposal attempts to buoy the honest-services
statute by providing that a "'scheme or artifice to defraud' also includes a
scheme or artifice by a public official to engage in undisclosed self-
dealing. "17
According to Alschuler, this proposal, and its near-passage by both the
House and Senate, highlights the fact that Washington is full of politicians
rather than lawyers, despite the fact that most of Washington's politicians
are trained as lawyers.18 Alschuler's concerns with Senator Leahy's pro-
posed statute are several, and he laments that the Senator's proposal
would, like other aspects of federal criminal law, just offer additional
tools to prosecutors rather than provide an appropriately narrowly tai-
lored statute to target well-defined wrongdoing.
Alschuler explains that Senator Leahy's proposal is vague and over-
broad, potentially criminalizing public officials' everyday activities. As
Alschuler puts it, public officials "cannot avoid ... self-dealing." 19 They
are often going to take official action that happens to further the financial
interests of a variety of people-many of whom may have provided
things of value to the officials. At the same time, though, the proposed
statute may be overly narrow. A public official could "reward someone
who had previously given something of value to [his] spouse" and not run
afoul of the self-dealing prohibition. 20 Moreover, a lobbyist could serve as
a middle-man, accepting payment from a contributor and purportedly in-
dependently providing a benefit to the public official.21 This, too, would
not constitute "self-dealing" under the proposal.22 Senator Leahy's pro-
posal also poses problems of determining what type of interests-
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) ("For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or
artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right
of honest services.").
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 1341 (2012) ("Whoever, having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.").
15. 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010) ("Construing the honest-services statute to extend beyond
that core meaning, we conclude, would encounter a vagueness shoal.").
16. Id.
17. S. 3854, 111th Cong. (2010); Alschuler, supra note 12, at 514.
18. See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 521 ("No member of Congress and no staff mem-
ber . . . seems to have adverted to the defects of the Leahy proposal described in this
article. Although many people on Capitol Hill are law school graduates and members of
the bar, there appear to be no lawyers there.").
19. Id. at 516.
20. See id. at 511.
21. See id. at 512.
22. See id.
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whether financial or other-are being advanced, and discerning an offi-
cial's purpose in performing an official act-something difficult to
establish.
In addition to concerns about the meaning of "self-dealing," the propo-
sal's conception of "non-disclosure" is problematic. Rather than outlining
the instances in which an official must disclose self-dealing, the proposal
relies on state disclosure requirements. 23 This contributes to a lack of uni-
formity in how the proposal could be applied. Moreover, by pilfering
state disclosure requirements, but ignoring state punishment provisions
for violations of these requirements, Senator Leahy's proposal diminishes
state power by federalizing a crime that was originally the state's domain.
Perhaps most concerning is the attempt to include the proposal as a
type of mail fraud. The mail fraud statute allows the prosecution to regale
the jury with tales of the defendant's bad behavior-to throw dirt at the
wall and see what sticks, "to convict the defendant simply for being a bad
person," to engage in a "smear campaign[ ]."124 Adding Leahy's proposal
to the mix would only exacerbate these concerns. It would give prosecu-
tors free reign to convict defendants based on bad character and ques-
tionable acts with less focus on actual mens rea and actus reus
requirements, and it would further obscure the reasons for which mail
fraud defendants were actually being convicted and punished.
As Alschuler suggests, broadly worded legislation, such as the federal
mail fraud statute, greatly expands the power held by American prosecu-
tors. It remains critical, therefore, to ensure that prosecutors use their
discretion fairly and effectively. One way in which the American system
attempts to guide prosecutorial discretion is through elections of chief
prosecutors. Yet as Ronald Wright shows in Beyond Prosecutor Elections,
these elections fail to hold prosecutors accountable in a meaningful
way.25
Wright surveys a sample of primary and general elections in fifteen
states and finds that the elections are strikingly uncompetitive. Incum-
bent prosecutors rarely face challengers, and, even when they do, incum-
bents win most of the time.26 Wright finds that certain features of the
electoral system, such as term limits and non-partisan elections, can help
increase turnover in prosecutors' offices to some degree.27 But on the
whole, prosecutorial elections remain non-competitive and fail to provide
prosecutors with sufficient "guidance about the priorities and policies
they should pursue to achieve public safety at an appropriate fiscal and
human cost." 28
23. See S. 3854, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
24. See Alschuler, supra note 12, at 520.
25. Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REv. 593 (2014).
26. Id. at 600-04. Wright finds that incumbent chief prosecutors run unopposed 80%
of the time in both general elections and primaries. Id. at 601.
27. Id. at 602-03.
28. Id. at 593.
4932014]
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Election campaigns also focus on the wrong issues. Wright reviews
news reports of candidate statements and finds that campaign rhetoric
tends to concentrate on the chief prosecutor's individual qualifications,
the quantity of cases processed, the conviction rate, and perhaps a few
high-profile trials. 29 By contrast, routine practices that define the bulk of
the prosecutor's work, such as plea bargaining and charging, are not
discussed.
It is difficult to know whether these shortcomings of the electoral pro-
cess are a function of its non-competitiveness, or if there are deeper
problems with popular oversight of prosecutors. For example, it is possi-
ble that the public does not know or believe that "convictions as
charged"-Wright's preferred metric-is a better measure by which to
evaluate prosecutors than the standard conviction rate. More generally,
the public might not be interested in the way prosecutors run their offices
as long as the crime rate is not unusually high. Wright mentions some of
these concerns about popular oversight of prosecutors, but he does not
appear to share them.30 Instead, he believes that greater transparency
about prosecutorial activities and more sustained deliberation on these
issues can produce well-informed public opinions that can helpfully guide
prosecutorial work.
To this end, Wright proposes building on the community prosecution
model to increase transparency of prosecutorial work and promote public
deliberation about it. He describes how community prosecution initia-
tives have helped advance these goals by soliciting public feedback
through polls, questionnaires, and other community events.31 Wright pro-
poses that prosecutors' offices build on this model and make more data
about their priorities and outcomes publicly available. Data interpret-
ers-such as the media, non-profit organizations, advocacy groups, and
scholars-could then analyze the information and use the results to rank
prosecutors' offices, educate the public about the findings, and highlight
areas in need of reform.32 Even if the public at large might be apathetic
or ignorant, special-interest groups are likely to have more intense prefer-
ences and a better understanding of prosecutorial practices. Wright sug-
gests that competition among these groups would help ensure that the
data analyses and rankings are fair, objective, and useful. Above all,
Wright convincingly argues that this process can help ignite a conversa-
tion that can enhance public understanding of prosecutorial functions and
offer more informed guidance to prosecutors. His contribution not only
uncovers the failure of elections to provide a meaningful check on prose-
cutors, but also offers a constructive and politically feasible proposal for
using data, rankings, and public deliberation to recharge the democratic
accountability of prosecutors.
29. See id. at 604-05.
30. Id. at 605 (noting views that it might be better to insulate prosecutors from voters,
who tend to focus on convictions and long sentences).
31. Id. at 610.
32. Id. at 610-15.
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Broad prosecutorial discretion, as both Alschuler and Wright acknowl-
edge, gives rise to concerns that defendants who have not engaged in
blameworthy conduct may be unjustly punished. This may happen when
legislators draft vague and broadly worded statutes, or when they fail to
require proof of mens rea for certain offenses. Darryl Brown observes in
Strict Liability in the Shadow of Juries that England and the United States
rely on such strict liability offenses more broadly than other countries.33
He argues that this reliance on strict liability can be explained at least in
part as a consequence of these two countries' reliance on juries to decide
facts in criminal cases.
Brown notes that certain crimes, such as public-welfare or regulatory
offenses, are particularly likely to entail circumstantial evidence about
the defendant's state of mind.34 Yet jurors-whom we entrust with fac-
tual determinations in criminal cases-are presumed to be especially
weak at finding facts by inference.35 Brown points to legal rules and prac-
tices which show that we do not trust the jury with circumstantial evi-
dence. Such rules and practices include the tradition of judicial
commentary on the evidence 36 and formal rules about evidentiary infer-
ences, which are conveyed to jurors through legal instructions. Both of
these procedural devices encourage jurors to draw particular conclusions
about the defendant's state of mind from certain kinds of evidence.
Brown argues that they reflect a concern about jurors' capacity to reach
these conclusions on their own.3 7
Brown suggests that this concern about the jury has affected not only
our evidentiary rules, but also some of our substantive criminal law prin-
ciples, including strict liability. He argues that the U.S. and English crimi-
nal justice systems adopted strict liability more broadly than other legal
systems at least in part as a means of addressing the unique difficulty of
using circumstantial evidence to prove mens rea to jurors. Brown ac-
knowledges that strict liability is driven by other goals as well: "deter-
rence, providing special protection to certain interests, the magnitude of
harms that follow from certain conduct."38 But he emphasizes that U.S.
courts have frequently pointed to difficulties of proof in justifying strict
liability and that this presents an important additional motivation for the
adoption of the doctrine.
While American and English legislatures and courts have accepted the
broad use of strict liability, they have also recognized the tension between
the doctrine and the notion that a culpable mind is a prerequisite for just
33. Darryl K. Brown, Strict Liability in the Shadow of Juries, 67 SMU L. REV. 525
(2014).
34. Id. at 535-37.
35. Id. at 534-35.
36. Judicial commentary in the United States has sharply declined since the nineteenth
century because of concerns that it could unduly influence the jury. Id. at 534-37; see also
Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do It So Differ-
ently from Just About Everyone Else, 30 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2013).
37. Id. at 534.
38. Id. at 537.
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punishment. 39 To address this concern, U.S. courts have placed their trust
in juries-and in jurors' "common sense instincts" and "capacity for nor-
mative judgment"- as a procedural safeguard against unjust convictions
in strict liability cases. 40
Although Brown is skeptical of these claims about the jury, some of the
available empirical evidence does suggest that jurors are more likely than
judges to acquit and that this pro-acquittal tendency reflects jurors' insis-
tence on a higher standard of proof.4 1 This may lend some support to the
view that juries offer a buffer against unjust convictions of non-culpable
defendants in strict liability cases. It may also offer an additional explana-
tion for the broad use of strict liability in the United States and England.
Strict liability may be a response not only to jurors' cognitive difficulties
in interpreting circumstantial evidence, but also to jurors' demanding
views of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Whatever the precise
way in which the jury shapes strict liability, Brown convincingly argues
that it does so, and in the process, deepens our understanding of the com-
plex interactions between criminal law and procedure.
In Juries and Prior Convictions: Managing the Demise of the Prior Con-
viction Exception to Apprendi, Nancy King discusses another example
where mistrust of juries' cognitive capacities has affected procedural and
evidentiary rules in our criminal justice system. 42 In Apprendi v. New
Jersey,43 the Supreme Court restored to juries the task of determining a
range of sentence-related facts that had long been decided by judges at
sentencing hearings. Facts that trigger an increase in the defendant's pen-
alty must now be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The court
carved out an important exception to this rule, however-prior convic-
tions may still be determined by judges rather than juries. As a result of
this exception, defendants may find out only at sentencing that they are
facing significantly harsher punishment than they realized when admit-
ting guilt or deciding to stand trial.44
One of the central reasons that the Supreme Court has given for pre-
serving this exception to Apprendi is that submitting prior convictions to
the jury would unduly prejudice defendants.45 Specifically, jurors would
tend to convict defendants based on evidence of the prior convictions,
rather than based on the facts of the case. 46
39. Id. at 525.
40. Id.
41. HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 101-106 (1966); The-
odore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of
Kalven & Zeisel's The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 173 (2005). But
see Andrew Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 151
(2005) (finding that the conviction rate after federal bench trials was significantly lower
than the conviction rate after federal jury trials).
42. Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior Convictions: Managing the Demise of the Prior
Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 67 SMU L. REV. 577 (2014).
43. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
44. King, supra note 42, at 578.
45. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998).
46. Id.
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King points out, however, that as an empirical matter, the prejudicial
effect of prior convictions is not as significant as many tend to assume; it
appears to make a difference only in borderline cases. 4 7 More impor-
tantly, King describes in useful detail how courts and legislatures in dif-
ferent jurisdictions have handled the problem of prejudice from prior
convictions for more than a century. 48 They have developed a range of
procedural tools for minimizing any prejudice associated with allowing
juries to consider prior convictions. These tools include: 1) partial guilty
pleas, whereby the defendant admits only the prior conviction and goes
to trial before a jury on the remaining facts; 2) partial jury waivers,
whereby the judge decides the prior conviction; 3) bifurcation of the trial
proceeding; and 4) stipulations and rules limiting what information about
the prior conviction may be admitted. 4 9
Some of these options-partial guilty pleas and jury waivers-exclude
the jury from determining prior convictions in most cases. Others, such as
bifurcation, stipulations, and rules limiting the information given to the
jury about the prior conviction, simply channel or restrict the jury's dis-
cretion. King expresses no preference among the different options for re-
ducing prejudice to defendants. She seems concerned not so much with
involving the jury in factfinding, but rather with providing defendants
with early notice about the punishment they might be facing upon convic-
tion. She points out that such notice helps defendants knowingly choose
between a guilty plea and trial.50 For this purpose, any of the options she
discusses would be satisfactory.
The concern about notice could also be accommodated to some degree
by discovery rules that require such information be disclosed before a
trial or guilty plea.51 Likewise, the related due process concern-that sen-
tence-enhancing facts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt-could be
addressed by using the higher burden of proof at sentencing, even when
sentencing is by the judge.52 As a practical matter, however, submitting
prior convictions to a jury is currently a more feasible alternative than the
other two potential reforms-it merely requires ending an already-con-
troversial exception to the Apprendi doctrine.
Anticipating that the Supreme Court will reconsider this question in
the near future, King persuasively rebuts the policy arguments for retain-
ing the recidivism exception. If the Court agrees with her analysis and
holds that juries should determine prior convictions, she has also pro-
47. King, supra note 42, at 579.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 580-90.
50. Id. at 582-83.
51. See, e.g., MINN. CRIM. PRoc. R. 9 (requiring disclosure "before the Rule 11 Omni-
bus Hearing" of "evidence the prosecutor may rely on in seeking an aggravated
sentence").
52. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt
Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1665 (1987).
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vided a useful guide to procedures that minimize any prejudice that might
follow from this holding.
Another type of evidence that might unduly affect jury decisionmaking
is social media evidence-an area that Nancy Marder explores in Jurors
and Social Media: Is a Fair Trial Still Possible?53 In this piece, Marder
asserts that social media's pervasive presence in the courtroom is eroding
defendants' constitutional rights to fair trials. In previous decades, the
Supreme Court has employed due-process analysis to address concerns
about media attention tainting the jury pool, 5 4 but the pervasiveness and
near unavoidability of social media brings this concern to a new level.
There are tales of jurors "tweeting" from the jury room and judges
"friending" jurors on Facebook. Yet judges have found it difficult to rein
in jurors and preserve fair trials in this new world of seemingly ines-
capable texting, blogging, friending, Instagramming, connecting, and
tweeting.
To address these fair-trial concerns, Marder advocates a "process view"
of juror education.55 She emphasizes the importance of informing, and
reminding, jurors at every possible stage of a proceeding that they are
prohibited from using social media to communicate about the case or
learn new details of the case. Marder explains that this process approach
will transform uninformed jurors into informed jurors who will refrain
from accessing social media about the case at bar. Marder acknowledges,
though, that the process view will not be effective in changing the behav-
iors of "recalcitrant jurors"; if jurors are set on improperly accessing in-
formation via social media, there is little that courts can do about it,
absent taking the extreme measure of sequestering jurors.56
Marder's concern about fair trials in our modern, technologically ad-
vanced society could be extended beyond these lay actors in the criminal
justice system. Judges, too, could be affected by social media and other
electronic resources. In fact, many judges today seem to have fairly open
approaches to obtaining evidence outside of the traditional adversary
process. For example, Justice Breyer has unapologetically conducted his
own Internet research in determining the facts of a case.57 And Judge
Posner made a splash earlier this year when he reported that one judge
on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals independently "experiment[ed]
with a novel approach," asking the court staff to don and doff specialized
clothing and equipment to thereby determine how long it would take the
plaintiffs in the case to do the same.58 Pervasive social media, other elec-
53. Nancy S. Marder, Jurors and Social Media: Is a Fair Trial Still Possible, 67 SMU L.
REV. 617 (2014).
54. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 377-99 (2010) (examining due
process concerns related to pretrial publicity).
55. Marder, supra note 53, at 618.
56. Id. at 618, 662-64.
57. See Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV.
1255, 1260-61 (2012).
58. See Mitchell v. JCG Indus., Inc., 745 F.3d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2014).
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tronic sources, and arguably overly inquisitive actors in the criminal jus-
tice system are a real concern to defendants' trial rights. While Marder's
"process view" may partially address this problem, it does not offer a
complete solution. As technology evolves and becomes even more acces-
sible, we will need to conjure up additional solutions to preserve defend-
ants' fair trial rights.
The jury remains an important institution in providing fair trials and
safeguarding against unjust prosecutions. Yet as Marder, King, and
Brown all show in their contributions, the jury is an imperfect factfinder.
Criminal procedure and evidentiary rules must at times restrain its discre-
tion and limit the information it receives in order to protect against
prejudice and inaccurate verdicts. Prosecutors are likewise fallible and
not sufficiently constrained by juries, judges, criminal codes, or elections.
We must therefore consider alternative ways to hold them accountable.
Wright proposes harnessing the power of technology and the media to do
so. As Alschuler suggests, legislators can also do more to prevent abusive
prosecutions by tailoring statutes more narrowly to truly culpable con-
duct. Delving further into the state's authority to define crimes, Garvey
urges us to reconsider the extent to which the state should censure or
punish those who are ignorant of the law. From the philosophical explo-
ration of mens rea to the practical questions of institutional design and
fair procedures, these Colloquium contributions help us to better under-
stand our criminal justice system and offer some innovative ideas about
how it can be improved.
2014] 499
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